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THE NEW BANKRUPTCY “DETECTIVE AGENCY”1? 
THE ORIGINS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKRUPTCY IN GREAT 
DEPRESSION CANADA 
 
Thomas G.W. Telfer* 
 
In the depths of the Great Depression, R.B. Bennett’s Conservative government appointed W.J. 
Reilley as Canada’s first Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Reilley’s experience made him eminently 
qualified. He had trained as a lawyer and had been the Registrar of the Bankruptcy Court of Ontario 
at Osgoode Hall for many years. The creation of the federal Superintendent’s office in 1932 is one 
of the major milestones in the legislative history of Canadian bankruptcy law. In the bankruptcy 
law literature, there is a broad recognition that the 1932 reforms were vital. These accounts are 
incomplete. This article seeks to provide a fuller understanding of these reforms by examining 
sources of opposition to the establishment of the Superintendent’s office. Not all accepted the new 
regulatory approach and the prospects of a bankruptcy bureaucracy during the Depression. Within 
months of Reilley taking office, critics called into question his qualifications and demanded his 
resignation. Little is known about the 1932 reforms as the creation of the Superintendent’s office 
has largely been overshadowed in the insolvency field by the enactment of corporate reorganization 





If you have lost the human touch, 
What you have left is nothing much. 
 
Best strip yourself until you see, 
You’ve lost your own humanity. 
 
And nothing found: You’ve nought to give, 
And really have no cause to live. 
 
 
1. “Canada’s Bankruptcy Superintendent” (1933) 7 J. Nat'l Ass'n Ref. Bankr. 109. 
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workshops and James Struthers, Peter Neary, Jassmine Girgis, Anna Lund and Virginia Torrie for their comments. 
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In the depths of the Great Depression, Prime Minister Bennett’s Conservative government 
appointed William J. Reilley as Canada’s first Superintendent of Bankruptcy. The creation of the 
Superintendent’s office in 19322 is one of the major milestones in the legislative history of Canadian 
bankruptcy law. The amendments to the federal Bankruptcy Act gave the new Superintendent broad 
investigatory and supervisory powers over the bankruptcy regime. Reilley’s experience made him 
eminently qualified for the position.3 He had trained as a lawyer and had been the Registrar of the 
Bankruptcy Court of Ontario at Osgoode Hall for eight years.4 In the bankruptcy law literature, 
there is a broad recognition of the importance of the 1932 reforms. The Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy continues to play an essential role in the supervision of the bankruptcy regime. 
 
This article provides an account of the origins of the Superintendent’s office and addresses two 
gaps in the existing literature.5 First, there has been no assessment of the amendments in the context 
of the Great Depression. The economic crisis might have hastened the reforms, but the 1932 
amendments were not a reaction to the Great Depression. The Bankruptcy Act amendments did 
nothing to assist individuals coping with the financial fallout from the Great Depression, as the 
reforms only had an administrative focus. Simply, debt relief was not the focus of the 1932 
amendments. The new regulatory regime responded to concerns about dishonest and corrupt 
trustees that had been raised in the 1920s, before the onset of the Great Depression. The roots of the 
legislation therefore can be found in the 1920s rather than in the Great Depression itself. Second, 
the article seeks to provide a more complete understanding of the 1932 reforms by examining 
sources of opposition to the establishment of the Superintendent’s office. Not all accepted the new 
regulatory approach and the prospect of a bankruptcy bureaucracy. Within months of Reilley taking 
 
2. An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1932, c. 39. The amendments came into force on December 1, 1932. See 
Bankruptcy Act, to amend (1932, c. 39), (1932) C. Gaz, 724. Minute of Meeting of Privy Council, P.C. 2047, (September 
14, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13-A, Box 2217, File No. 1932-1934, Library and Archives Canada 
(L.A.C). 
3. See Lewis Duncan, “The Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act of 1932: Part II” (1932), 2 Fortnightly L.J. 101, at p. 103. 
4. Kenneth R. Wilson, “Bankruptcy Head has $50,000,000 Job: W.J. Reilley Thinks New Federal Statute is Good 
Weapon to Stem Bankruptcy Abuses in Canada,” The Financial Post, October 1, 1932, pp. 1, 8.  
5. There are some limited accounts of the developments leading up to the 1932 amendments. The best account is John 
Honsberger, “Bankruptcy Administration in the United States and Canada” (1975), 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1515, at p. 1534. 
See also Henri Massü-Monat, “Méchanismes Administratifs Surintendant et Séquestre Officiel” in Albert Bohémier, 
Faillite et Insolvabilité, Tome 1 (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 1992) at p. 484; Canada, Report of the Study Committee 
on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970) at p. 18; Louise Lalonde, “Fairness and Due 
Process, Update on the Disciplinary Powers of the OSB Over Trustees” in Janis Sarra and Barbara Romaine, eds., 
Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2006 (Toronto: Carswell, 2007)  7; Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Mayrand, 2005 F.C. 
702, at paras 63-65. 
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office, critics called into question his qualifications and demanded his resignation. Part II of the 
article places the reforms in the context of the Great Depression, Part III examines the origins of the 
office of the Superintendent and Part IV focuses on the arguments of those who opposed the new 





II. THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
 
When Parliament debated the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in April and May of 1932, 
Members of Parliament (“MPs”) had an opportunity to re-assess the role of the discharge in the 
credit economy of the Great Depression.  The bankruptcy law debates coincided with a devastating 
unemployment crisis. By the spring of 1932, “[Prime Minister] Bennett, with the rest of the country, 
seemed to have hit rock bottom.”6 One might assume that the 1932 amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Act were a response to the economic crisis. Parliament might have made substantive changes to the 
bankruptcy discharge to provide debtors with greater relief. Parliament did not. Alternatively, 
Parliament could have emulated Western provincial debt adjustment legislation. In the 1920s, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta had aggressively forged ahead in enacting debtor legislation aimed at 
sheltering debtors from the actions of creditors.7 Manitoba introduced similar legislation in 1931.8 
Provincial debt adjustment legislation enacted broad stays against creditors and enabled 
administrative boards to prevent creditors from “oppressively” using the law “to assert his rights” 
against debtors.9  Provinces that took steps to enact debt adjustment legislation must have 
considered the Bankruptcy Act “insufficient or poorly suited to their regional needs.”10 When 
 
6. James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State 1914-1941 (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1983) at p. 69. 
7. See Thomas G.W. Telfer, “Rediscovering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Power: Political and Constitutional 
Challenges to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, 1919-1929” (2017), 80 Sask. L. Rev. 37. Saskatchewan: The Drought 
Relief Act, S.A. 1922, c. 43; The Debt Adjustment Act, S.A. 1923, c. 43; The Debt Adjustment Act, R.S.S. 1928-29, c. 
53. As of 1932, The Debt Adjustment Act, S.S. 1932, c. 51 was in force in Saskatchewan. Alberta: The Debt Adjustment 
Act, S.A. 1931, c. 57; The Debt Adjustment Act, S.A. 1933, c. 13. The Alberta legislation was eventually ruled ultra 
vires by the Privy Council in 1943: Reference Re: Debt Adjustment Act, 1937 (Alberta), [1943] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.).  As 
early as 1934, the Department of Justice considered provincial debt adjustment legislation to be ultra vires. 
“Memorandum for Deputy Minister of Justice, (January 22, 1934), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13 vol. 391, File 
1577, L.A.C. 
8. See The Debt Adjustment Act, S.M. 1931, c. 7 and The Debt Adjustment Act, S.M. 1932, c. 8. For commentary on the 
scope of the Manitoba legislation see F.R., “Recent Manitoba Legislation” (1931), 1 Fortnightly L.J. 25, at p. 29. For 
an overview of the operation of debt relief legislation see Roderick Wood, “Enforcement Remedies of Creditors” 
(1996), 34 Alta L. Rev. 783, at p. 786; S. David Cohen, “Law, Order and Democracy: An Analysis of the Judiciary in 
a Progressive State-the Saskatchewan Experience” (1992), 56 Sask. L. Rev. 23, at p. 31. 
9. Mutual Life Assurance v. Levitt, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 324 (Alta S.C. (A.D.)), at p. 329. In 1934, there was a belief that 
Bennett might amend the Bankruptcy Act to somehow suspend provincial moratorium laws. This never happened but 
later that year Bennett would enact the F.C.A.A. See “Bennett May Amend the Bankruptcy Act to Nullify Moratoria,” 
The Financial Post, March 24, 1934, p. 1. 
10. Albert Bohémier, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency” (January 7, 2015), at Part I-A (study delivered to Civil Law Section 
of the Department of Justice) online <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/harmonization/bohemier/bankr-
failli.html>. 
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Parliament amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1932, federal MPs chose not to follow provincial 
reforms.11  
 
A review of Hansard and the proceedings of the Special Committee appointed to review the 
1932 bankruptcy Bill reveals that there is no mention of using a revised Bankruptcy Act to respond 
to the Great Depression. The resolution that accompanied the Bill’s introduction to the House 
focused solely on administrative reforms:12 
 
Resolved, that it is expedient to bring in a measure to amend the Bankruptcy Act, and to 
provide for the administration of the act by the Minister of Finance, and for the 
appointment of a superintendent of bankruptcy...and for the licensing of trustees and 
payment of fees therefore. 
 
One Member of Parliament summed up the effects of the 1932 Bill: “[T]he provisions of 
this Bill undoubtedly give a great deal more protection to the creditors than they have had in the 
past.”13  Most of the Parliamentary debate on the Bill focused on administrative matters such as the 
desirability of appointing a new Superintendent of Bankruptcy and of the licencing of trustees in 
bankruptcy. In 1932, it appears as if Parliament was content to allow provinces to deal with the 
protection of debtors.14  
 
During the Great Depression, Parliament was certainly aware of the plight of insolvent 
debtors. It eventually passed specific federal legislation to protect insolvent companies in 193315 
and insolvent farmers in 1934.16 The Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“F.C.A.A.”)17 allowed 
families to remain on the farm rather than face foreclosure. A board had the authority to “write 
down debt to manageable proportions and draw up repayment terms which would give the farmer 
a new start.” The F.C.A.A. “compromised the Conservative government’s adamance about the 
sanctity of private contracts.”18 Perhaps the farming community was too important to be ignored.19 
But there was to be no similar relief for non-farming debtors. In 1933, Bennett was asked in the 
House of Commons whether Parliament might act to assist debtors who had defaulted on home 
mortgages. One MP expressed concern about homeowners who “find themselves ousted” by 
 
11. Parliament responded to debt adjustment legislation by passing the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, S.C. 1934, 
c. 53. The F.C.A.A. sought to protect farmers from creditors. Ordinary non-farmer debtors received no similar 
protection from the 1932 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.  
 
12. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), II (April 5, 1932), at p. 1703 (Hon. Hugh 
Guthrie). 
13. Canada, Senate, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), I (May 24, 1932), at p. 462 (Hon. Mr. Little). 
14. See P.B. Waite, In Search of R.B. Bennett (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) at p. 
128. 
15. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, S.C. 1933, c. 36. 
16. Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, S.C. 1934, c. 53. 
17. Virginia Torrie, “Farm Debt Compromises during the Great Depression” (2018), 41 Man. L.J. 377; Virginia Torrie, 
“Federalism and Farm Debt during the Great Depression: Political Impetuses for the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement 
Act, 1934” (2019) 82:2 Sask. L. Rev. 203. 
18. John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1985) at p. 257.  
19. On the political reasons for the enactment of the F.C.A.A. see Virginia Torrie, “Federalism and Farm Debt”, supra, 
footnote 17.  
	 5	
creditors. Bennett replied that this “is a matter solely within the jurisdiction of the province….[W]e 
cannot exercise any jurisdiction.”20  
 
III. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKRUPTCY AND LICENCING TRUSTEES 
	
1. Trustee Practices in the 1920s and Demands for Reform 
The new regulatory approach of 1932 largely responded to complaints about fraudulent 
trustees that had arisen during the 1920s and were not specific to the economic crisis.  Parliament 
looked back to the 1920s as an inspiration for reform. The Bankruptcy Act and the 1923 amending 
legislation gave rise to fraudulent trustee practices during the 1920s. Investigations into these 
trustee practices began before the stock market crash of 1929. In 1929, Lewis Duncan responded 
to the trustee crisis by recommending that “there was a need in Canada for an adequately staffed 
bankruptcy department with offices at strategic centres.”21 
 
The best summary of abusive trustee practices in Canada is found in Robert H. Thayer’s 
thirty-page Report on Bankruptcy Administration in Canada published in 1930.22 Although released 
on March 22, 1930, it is clear that Thayer began his investigation before the crash. Thayer reviewed 
all trustee reports of liquidated estates for the period November 1, 1928 – September 7, 1929.23 
Thayer identified fraudulent trustees as one of the main abuses arising from the operation of the 
Bankruptcy Act. He found that “fraudulent trustee organizations who, with the assistance of 
dishonest debtors, are able through the machinery of the Act to gain control over estates... as 
Trustees.”24 Thayer discovered evidence of fictitious creditor claims being filed to “control the 
election of the Trustee.”25 In the West, Thayer heard complaints of trustees favouring debtors by 
“not searching too severely for fraud, in order to gain the reputation of being favorable to debtors.”26  
In Québec, Thayer noted that business practices were different in that there “is a large foreign 
element in business chiefly from Central Europe.”27 Thus, in Québec “dishonest bankruptcies are 
frequent and fraudulent trustee organizations and individuals exist in large numbers.” Thayer 
reported that “Incompetent and untrustworthy individuals who are not in the liquidation business 
are quite often asked for and appointed Custodian and gain election as Trustee, and often the 
debtor’s own accountant is able to obtain these positions.28 Thayer noted a significant demand in 
the East “for a system that will protect creditors from dishonest Trustees and permit only competent 
and trustworthy organizations to conduct a liquidation business.”29  
 
 
20. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 4 (June 4, 1934), at p. 3645 (Venoit) (Bennett). 
21. Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy, supra, footnote 5, at p. 18. 
22. Robert H. Thayer, Report on Bankruptcy Administration in Canada [Thayer Report] in William J. Donovan, In the 
Matter of an Inquiry into the Administration of Bankrupts' Estates Conducted before Hon. Thomas D. Thatcher, Judge 
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York: Court Press, 1930) [Donovan 
Report]. 
23. Ibid., at p. 237. 
24. Ibid., at p. 260. 
25. Ibid., at p. 261. 
26. Ibid., at pp. 261-2. 
27. Ibid., at p. 262. Perhaps this was a veiled reference to the Jewish population in Montreal. This view is consistent with 




The Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”) also studied abusive trustee practices from the 
1920s and issued a Report of the Special Committee on Bankruptcy on August 28, 1931.30 The 
origins of this report also pre-date the Great Depression. In 1929, the Montreal Bar Association 
investigated allegations of trustee malpractice and found that there “was a deplorable state of 
affairs.”31 This report led the CBA to authorize its own study in August 1930. The CBA listed the 
principal criticisms of the bankruptcy regime as (i) the trustee is dishonest (ii) the trustee is 
inefficient and (iii) the trustee is administering the estate for the benefit of debtors or specific 
creditors.32 The economic crisis did not lead the CBA to recommend any changes to the debtor relief 
regime. The CBA Committee concluded that it was “not advisable to effect any changes to the 
substance of the Bankruptcy Act itself.”33 The Committee only recommended that the 
“administration of the Act must be changed.”34 Parliament ultimately adopted the two major CBA 
recommendations:35 (i) the creation of a Superintendent of Bankruptcy and (ii) the establishment of 
a licencing regime for trustees.  In introducing the Bankruptcy Bill, the Minister of Justice, Hugh 
Guthrie, announced to the House that “it would be in the interests of the whole community” for 
Parliament to adopt the CBA’s proposals as amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.36 R.B. Bennett had 
served as President of the CBA from 1929-30,37 just before the CBA issued its Report. It is not 
surprising that when he became Prime Minister, the CBA Report became the very basis for the 
bankruptcy Bill.  
 
2. The Powers of the Superintendent and Licencing of Trustees 
Following the CBA’s recommendation, Parliament created the office of the Superintendent 
of Bankruptcy.38 An internal memorandum prepared for the Minister of Justice outlined the shift 
away from creditor control: “It appears to be the case that the administration of bankrupt estates 
must be supervised by the government.”39 Operating out of a new department of the Ministry of 
Finance, William J. Reilley, as Superintendent, had responsibility for supervising “the 
administration of all bankrupt or insolvent estates.”40 With this responsibility came broad powers 
 
30. Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Bankruptcy (1931) [C.B.A. Report].  
31. Ibid., at p. 1. The Canadian Bar Association committee was comprised of the President of the C.B.A., Louis St. 
Laurent and leading bankruptcy experts including: H.P. Grundy, Lewis Duncan and Jacques Panneton. “Amendment 
urged to Bankruptcy Act by Public Bodies” (undated press clipping), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13-A, Box 
2217, File No. 1932-1934, L.A.C. 
32. Memorandum for Deputy Minister of Justice, (February 4, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13-A, Box 
2217, File No. 1932-1934, L.A.C, at p. 1. 
33. C.B.A., Report of Special Committee, supra, footnote 30, at p. 1. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid., at p. 2. 
36. Canada, House of Commons Official Report of Debates (Hansard), II (April 5, 1932), at p. 1703. A Department of 
Justice internal memorandum confirms the influence of the C.B.A. Report on the Bankruptcy Bill. “Memorandum re 
Bankruptcy Bill” (1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13, Box 2217, File No. 1932-1934, L.A.C. 
37. P.B. Waite, In Search of R.B. Bennett (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) at p. 71.  See 
also the list of Past C.B.A. Presidents, online <https://www.cba.org/Who-We-Are/Governance/Board-of-
Directors/Past-CBA-Presidents>. 
38. The Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 11, as amended by An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1931, c. 17; An 
Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act (Priority of Claims), S.C. 1931, c. 18; An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1932, 
c. 39, s. 36A(1).  
39. F.P. Varcoe, Memorandum to Minister of Justice, (February 23, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13A2, 
vol. 2217, File 934/1932, L.A.C. 
40. Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 38, s. 36A(2).  
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of investigation and the ability to inspect any bankruptcy estate.41 More importantly, the legislation 
set up a mandatory licencing regime for trustees in bankruptcy. The legislation required applicants 
to apply directly to the Superintendent who was to investigate “the character, business experience, 
and efficiency of the applicant.”42 The Superintendent’s report on the applicant was crucial. As John 
Honsberger notes, “[i]f the applicant measured up to the requisite standards, the licence was issued 
by the Minister on the recommendation of the Superintendent.”43 Once the licence was issued, 
Reilley continued to have broad oversight. Reilley had responsibility for licence renewals44 and was 
required to report to the Minister if it appeared that a licensed trustee had “not fully complied with 
the law.”45 The Minister, after receiving any report from the Superintendent, could “suspend or 
cancel any licence”46 and these powers of suspension or cancellation could be used as threats to 
govern recalcitrant trustees.  
 
IV. OPPOSITION TO THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKRUPTCY 
 
1. Political Opposition 
In 1932, there was a broad consensus on the need to license and regulate trustees. Such 
regulation could be best achieved through a federal civil servant at the apex of the entire bankruptcy 
regime. The House of Commons Special Committee on Bill C-41 (after six days of testimony and 
hearing from 19 witnesses) unanimously approved the bankruptcy reforms. When the matter moved 
to the House of Commons and the Senate, the Bill passed with broad support. By establishing the 
Superintendent’s position, Parliament recognized that the state had an interest in the administration 
of bankruptcies,47 but not all agreed. In the midst of the Great Depression some were reluctant to 
grow the size of the state and there was a fear of a new bankruptcy bureaucracy. Creating a new 
government official to supervise trustees was a dramatic departure from a prior policy decision to 
leave trustee regulation to the market. 
  
In 1919, Parliament had made a deliberate policy choice not to provide government 
oversight of trustees and many defended the lack of state apparatus.48 Thus, in 1920, the Monetary 
Times reported that the Bankruptcy Act would need “very little administrative machinery at 
Ottawa.”49 H.P. Grundy, who had drafted the 1919 Bankruptcy Act, defended the lack of regulatory 
oversight in a 1927 article published in the Monetary Times. He argued that the Canadian Act 
avoided the “expensive red tape machinery which exists under the English and American Acts.”50 
In the 1920s, there were reform proposals asking for greater government oversight. One such 
proposal was sensitive to the charge that reforms would create a bankruptcy department. Saturday 
 
41. Ibid., s. 36A(2). 
42. Ibid., s. 36A(3). 
43. John Honsberger, “Bankruptcy Administration in the United States and Canada” (1975), 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1515, at p. 
1535. 
44. Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 38, s. 36A(3)(c). Licences expired on the 31st of each year and could be renewed 
from year to year. 
45. Ibid., s. 36A(3)(h). 
46. Ibid., s. 36A(4). 
47. Albert Bohémier, Faillite et Insolvabilité, Tome 1 (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 1992) at p. 479. 
48. Bram Thomson, “Canadian Bankruptcy Act—Monopoly of the Trusteeship and of the Law” (1921), 41 Can. L.T. 
96. 
49. “Operations of the Dominion Bankruptcy Act,” 65:25 The Monetary Times, December 17, 1920, p. 7. 
50. H.P. Grundy, “Bankruptcy Act a Real Benefit,” 78:24 The Monetary Times, June 17, 1927, p. 14. 
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Night’s 1925 proposal for a “Government Department” was not to be “formed with its attendant red 
tape and hosts of indolent office holders.” Lest the author be accused of nefariously growing the 
size of the state, the writer assured readers that the suggestion for regulation did not emanate “from 
Leningrad.” The editorial explained that any new department would not require great numbers of 
staff. Under Saturday Night’s proposal the “new officer would be a guardian and a watch dog, 
perhaps a bit of a fox hound” but his duties would be “fairly simple and capable of being performed 
within a short time.”51  
 
 An unregulated bankruptcy regime, however, proved to be too costly. Hugh Guthrie, 
Minister of Justice, noted the cost of administration was a “chief complaint” and that in some 
instances there had been reports “that the fees paid to trustees, [and] to lawyers...eat up the whole 
available estate so there is nothing left for the creditors.”52 Senator Meighen echoed this sentiment, 
noting that “creditors have had very bare bones” by the time that trustees and lawyers had been 
paid.53 Under the new regime, the government claimed that “every cent of the estate” would be 
“properly accounted for” since the Ministry of Finance would “have a man there in the position of 
superintendent to see that that scale is not exceeded.”54 The Superintendent would therefore reduce 
the costs of administering bankruptcies. Guthrie claimed that “it has been considered that if someone 
had a commanding position in control of the whole machinery, having jurisdiction throughout the 
whole of Canada, much of the expense now involved in the winding up of estates might be done 
away with.”55 
 
Not all MPs agreed with the idea of building a new bankruptcy bureaucracy in Ottawa. 
Franklin Turnbull, a Conservative MP from Regina, broke with Bennett’s government to condemn 
the amendments. He was “sorry to see the growth of any large amount of government departmental 
assistance to the superintendent, and would be very sorry to see any great extent of financial 
responsibility incurred.”56 Turnbull feared broad investigatory powers would lead to the “building 
up of a very large and expensive staff at Ottawa under the superintendent of bankruptcy.”57 Turnbull 
noted that the requirement to keep a “close and constant supervision over the administration of 
estates” would be difficult and costly. Turnbull claimed that “these estates are scattered all over 
Canada and are numerous, will mean the necessity of keeping a fairly substantial staff for the 
purpose of taking care of that supervision and inspection. For it is not merely supervision, it is 
inspection as well.”58 
 
 
51. Terence Sheard, “Present Canadian Bankruptcy Act Will Not Do,” 40:9 Saturday Night, 1925, p. 13. 
52. Canada, House of Commons Official Report of Debates (Hansard), II (April 5, 1932), at p. 1703 (Hon. Hugh 
Guthrie). 
53. Canada, Senate, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), I (May 24, 1932), at p. 459 (Right Hon. Arthur Meighen). 
54. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates Canada, (Hansard), vol. III (May 19, 1932), at pp. 3083-84 
(Hon. Hugh Guthrie)  
55. Canada, House of Commons Official Report of Debates (Hansard), II (April 5, 1932), at p. 1703-04 (Hon. Hugh 
Guthrie).  
56. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), III (May 19, 1932), at p. 3069 (Franklin White 
Turnbull). Business leaders reported to Robert Thayer that they did not believe the solution to the trustee problem was 
more supervision. They were satisfied with the creditor control model established by the 1919 Act. See Thayer Report 
at p. 265. 
57. Ibid., at p. 3071 (Franklin White Turnbull). 
58. Ibid., at pp. 3069-70 (Franklin White Turnbull). 
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Arthur Cardin, a Liberal MP from Québec, argued that overall bankruptcy costs would not 
be reduced given that the Superintendent “and his staff will have to be paid.”59 According to Cardin, 
the Superintendent’s investigations would take him across “the whole of Canada,” supported by an 
“assistant... accountants, stenographers and other officials.”60 Cardin was of the view that the 
present Bill would create “a new bureaucracy, and from now on the affairs of insolvent debtors are 
going to be governed, not by law, but by regulations.” 61 There was also a fear that the government 
may be liable in the event there was a loss to creditors where it was discovered that “supervising by 
the superintendent had not been efficient.”62   
 
Before the Parliamentary Special Committee on Bill C-41, G.T. Clarkson, representing the 
Toronto Board of Trade, expressed deep concern about the wide investigatory powers of the 
Superintendent.  The Superintendent could launch an inspection of a bankrupt estate without having 
to wait for a formal complaint. Some feared that such broad powers would have to be supported by 
a large staff. Clarkson claimed that under the Bill the Superintendent “will have an enormous 
department. [The Toronto Board of Trade is] very much set against such wide powers being given 
to him, also set against the cost being set as a burden on the estate.”63 In a separate letter to the 
Ministry of Justice, the Toronto Board of Trade “feared” that a “large separate department will in 
due course  grow up involving heavy expenses which will be doubtless charged against the bankrupt 
estate.”64 A 1933 American law journal recognized the implications of the Superintendent’s broad 
powers. Reilley had “virtually carte blanche to delve into the countless” individual bankruptcies. If 
Reilley’s powers were carried out “literally,” it might mean “the setting up of [a virtual] national 
detective agency...on all phases of bankruptcy in Canada.”65 
 
 To respond to concerns that Parliament was creating a new expensive bureaucracy, the 
government imposed a levy “on all payments made by the trustee,” including payments of dividends 
by the trustee to creditors.66 The purpose was to defray the expenses of the Superintendent67 and the 
levy was to be paid to the Receiver General.68 An internal Department of Justice document 
optimistically claimed that the “estimated revenue would pay for the supervision” of the 
 
59. Ibid., at p. 3062 (Pierre-Joseph-Arthur Cardin). 
60. Ibid., at p. 3071 (Pierre-Joseph-Arthur Cardin). 
61. Ibid., at p. 3062 (Pierre-Joseph-Arthur Cardin). 
62. Ibid., at p. 3071 (Pierre-Joseph-Arthur Cardin). 
63. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Bill No. 41, An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence No. 1 (April 1932), at pp. 13 – 14 (Clarkson). 
64. Toronto Board of Trade to Minister of Justice, (April 16, 1932), Bennett Papers, MG26K. Reel M966, p. 66516, 
L.A.C. 
65. “Canada’s Bankruptcy Superintendent”, supra, footnote 1.  
66. Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 38, s. 126(A). On the scope of the levy see Lavallée c. Lamarre (1933), 15 C.B.R. 
159 (Que. C.S.); Allan’s Ltd. v. Lamarre (1932), 14 C.B.R. 179 (Que. C.S.); Colonial Manufacturing Co., Re, [1934] 
1 D.L.R. 703 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Labbe v. Bonnier (1938), 19 C.B.R. 243 (Que. C.S.), at para. 9. The levy continues to 
exist today. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 147. 
67. Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 38, s. 126(A). The Manitoba Court of Appeal in recent decision concluded that the 
levy was to ensure that all creditors that received a bankruptcy distribution “contribute to the cost of supervision of 
those proceedings.” Superintendent of Bankruptcy v. Business Development Bank of Canada, (2019), 71 C.B.R. (6th) 
30 (Man. C.A), at para. 6. 
68. Bankruptcy Act, supra, footnote 38, s. 126(A). The levy did not impact fees and expenses of the trustee. P.C. 2588, 
November 23, 1932 fixed the levy at one-half of one percent. See Lewis Duncan and William John Reilley, Bankruptcy 
in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Legal Authors, 1933) at p. 725. 
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Superintendent.69  Although the levy helped fund the office of the Superintendent, there was still 
resistance to this model. Two witnesses who appeared before the Parliamentary Special Committee 
opposed the levy. H.P. Grundy, representing the Canadian Credit Men’s Trust Association, claimed 
that “[i]f this committee and this parliament deems it advisable for the purpose of putting the 
administration of bankruptcy on a clean and proper basis that there should be a superintendent, then 
we are not opposing it provided we [the creditors] do not have to pay the shot.”70 G.T. Clarkson, 
representing the Toronto Board of Trade, stated that “[i]t is all right to approve of superintendents 
and the licensing of trustees providing the cost is paid by the Government.”71 Lewis Duncan warned 
that the levy “is unnecessarily irritating and will no doubt be used for propagandist purposes by 
interests opposed to the continuation of the office of Superintendent.”72 Opponents73 of the 
Superintendent and levy did not succeed in preventing the new bankruptcy bureaucracy from being 
established. There was broad consensus in Parliament that reform was required. The creation of a 
new state apparatus during the Great Depression did raise real and significant issues for some MPs 
and interest groups. But such opposition could not overcome Bennett’s willingness to rely upon 
state regulation.  
 
It was Bennett, a self-proclaimed reformer, who presided over the creation of the new 
administrative agency of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. During his time in office Bennett did 
not shy away from using the power of the state. This was the government that created the CBC, the 
Bank of Canada, and the Canadian Wheat Board, and had passed the National Products Marketing 
Act.74 Bennett would later say in 1934, “I am for reform. And, in my mind, reform means 
Government intervention. It means Government control and regulation.”75 In a 1935 radio address, 
in which Bennett revealed his New Deal proposals, he said: 76   
 
And, in my mind, reform means Government intervention. It means Government control 
and regulation. It means the end of laissez faire. Reform heralds certain recovery. There 
can be no permanent recovery without reform. Reform or no reform! I raise that issue 
squarely. I nail the flag to the masthead. I summon the power of the State to its support.  
 
Bennett’s use of the state and his New Deal proposals (e.g. the regulation of hours and wages, and 
unemployment insurance)77 are well known but the creation of the new regulatory office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy has been overlooked by historians of the Great Depression. 
 
69. Memorandum for Deputy Minister of Justice, (February 4, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13-A, Box 
2217, File No. 1932-1934, L.A.C, at p. 2. 
70. Special Committee on Bill No. 41, supra, footnote 63, at p. 3 (Chair: John T Hackett). It is clear that the government 
privately consulted with H.P. Grundy, the drafter of the original Bankruptcy Act. F.P. Varcoe, Department of Justice to 
H.P. Grundy, (January 23, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13-A, Box 2217, File No 1932-1934, L.A.C.   
71. Special Committee on Bill No. 41, supra, footnote 63, at p. 14 (Chair: John T Hackett). 
72. Duncan, supra, footnote 3, at p. 101. 
73. See e.g. Saint John Board of Trade to Minister of Justice, (February 15, 1932), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 
13-A, Box 2217, File No. 1932-1934, L.A.C. 
74. Thompson and Seager, supra, footnote 18, at pp. 256-257; Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties 
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979) at p. 58. The Natural Products Marketing Act, S.C. 1934, c. 64 was later declared to 
be ultra vires. Reference re Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 691 (P.C.). 
75. Ottawa Citizen, December 15, 1934 as cited in P.B. Waite, In Search of R.B. Bennett (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) at p. 199. 
76. J.R.H. Wilbur, The Bennett New Deal: Fraud or Portent (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1968) at p. 81. 
77. Many of Bennett’s New Deal promises would ultimately be overturned by the Privy Council on the basis that the 
federal government did not have jurisdiction over these issues. See e.g., Reference re The Weekly Rest in Industrial 
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There was little opposition to the reforms from the Canadian legal profession.  In contrast 
to the Canadian experience, David Skeel’s study of U.S. bankruptcy reform reveals that the 
bankruptcy bar “derailed” proposals to provide government oversight of the bankruptcy regime.78 
A 1932 Congressional Bill proposed to appoint a staff of government administrators to supervise 
the bankruptcy system.79 As Skeel notes, the theme of the proposed changes was clear: “lawmakers 
should shift a large dose of control from the parties and their lawyers to governmental 
administrators.”80 When Congress introduced reforms the legal community coalesced to oppose the 
regime. The National Association of Federal Practitioners, representing the bankruptcy bar,81 
claimed that if the Bill were to pass, bankruptcy estates would come under “bureaucratic 
domination, and cost the taxpayers millions of dollars,” leaving lawyers without any role in 
bankruptcy cases.82 Congress never adopted these sweeping reforms. Skeel notes that the only 
effective organized group opposing bankruptcy reform was the bankruptcy bar. Skeel suggests that 
“lawyers were the principal obstacle to more sweeping, structural change.”83 In the United States, 
the bankruptcy bar played a dominant role in bankruptcy files, and opposed any changes that would 
threaten that role. 
 
In Canada, lawyers have only ever played a minor role in personal bankruptcy 
proceedings.84 The Thayer Report notes that in the Western provinces lawyers were not required in 
bankruptcy matters. In the East, the report concluded that when lawyers were involved fees were 
limited.85 When Thayer sought input from lawyers they claimed that “liquidation [arising from a 
bankruptcy] is an economic [order] rather than a legal function.” The Bankruptcy Act “resulted in a 
lack of need for their services and a resultant diminution in the volume of their practice[s].”86 When 
H.P. Grundy, the drafter of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, testified before the Donovan Committee 
he described the Canadian regime as cheaper than US bankruptcy proceedings. Grundy noted that 
the Canadian Act “practically eliminates lawyers from all bankruptcy proceedings and abolishes 
 
Undertakings Act, Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.); Reference 
re The Employment and Social Insurance Act, 1935, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684 (P.C.). See E.A. Heaman, A Short History of 
the State in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at p. 170; W. H. McConnell, “The Judicial Review 
of Prime Minister Bennett’s New Deal” (1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 39, at p. 41. However, the F.C.A.A. was upheld 
by the Privy Council in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1936] S.C.R. 384, 3 
D.L.R. 610 (S.C.C.) [F.C.A.A. Reference]; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1937] 
1 W.W.R. 320, 1 D.L.R. 695 (J.C.P.C.). 
 
78. David A. Skeel, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001) at p. 79. 
79. Ibid., at p. 74. 
80. Ibid., at p. 79. 
81. Ibid., at p. 91. Skeel notes that this group of bankruptcy lawyers was formed to oppose the Bill. See also M. Susan 
Murane, Bankruptcy in an Industrial Society (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2015) at p. 133. 
82. Jacob Weinstein, Letter on Behalf of the National Association of Federal Practitioners, 1932 cited in Skeel, supra, 
footnote 78, at p. 91. 
83. Skeel, supra, footnote 78, at p. 92. 
84. Some of the best literature on the operation of the Bankruptcy Act can be found in the Canadian Chartered Accountant 
journal. See e.g. G.T. Clarkson, “The Bankruptcy Act” (1920-21), 10 Can. Chartered Accountant 154; Osler Wade, 
“The Dominion Bankruptcy Act” (1921), 10 Can. Chartered Accountant 234. 
85. Thayer, supra, footnote 22, at p. 258. 
86. Ibid., at p. 265. 
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red tape.”87 He claimed that the Canadian system was more efficient as it eliminated “any abuse on 
the part of attorneys in making use of the bankruptcy machinery for the purpose of getting fees.”88 
 
Although lawyers had a limited role in Canadian bankruptcy proceedings, it was the CBA’s 
influential report that ultimately led to the 1932 administrative reforms. Unlike the United States, 
the Canadian legal community did not oppose reforms. The Canadian legal profession had no 
substantial bankruptcy practice to protect. Even Canadian trustees did not launch any opposition to 
the proposed new administrative regime, likely because they did not view it as a threat to their 
livelihood. Those trustees who had practised prior to 1932 were counting on becoming a licensed 
trustee. The licensing regime would help curtail competition as it limited the number of incoming 
trustees. Opposition to the new licensing regime did not raise its head until after Reilley announced 
the results of the first licensing applications. Reilley’s announcement of who was to be a licensed 
trustee in Québec resulted in his censure by the Montreal Bar. To understand the controversy of 
Reilley in Québec, it is important to provide some constitutional law context from the 1920s to 
identify why there might be Québec opposition. 
 
2. Opposition to the Superintendent: The Constitutional Perspective 
The threat of a new federal administrative bankruptcy department raised questions about the 
limits of the federal bankruptcy power under the British North America Act, 1867, but there were 
no constitutional challenges to the new Superintendent’s powers. This contrasted with the 
constitutional uncertainty surrounding the federal bankruptcy power in the 1920s.89 Throughout the 
1920s, many in Quebec opposed the federal bankruptcy law’s interference with the Civil Code. The 
Privy Council in Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue90 ended that uncertainty by ruling that the federal 
Bankruptcy Act took precedence over Québec judicial hypothecs reducing judgments to a state of 
equality in a bankruptcy. When the Privy Council released its decision in 1928, the Revue du Droit 
published “Démolisseurs!,” in which a Québec lawyer condemned Royal Bank v. Larue as 
destructive to Québec civil law:91  
 
This disastrous, literally inexplicable decision made one more, broader blow in the barrier 
of protection that surrounded our provincial law. It was already quite damaged. It falls, 
of course, into ruins and no longer offers any security: how could one place its trust in it? 
  
Given the political and constitutional context of the 1920s, it is not surprising that provincial 
rights arguments surfaced when Parliament sought to create a new federal official in Ottawa. But in 
1932 it was only a lone Québec MP who challenged the new Superintendent’s office from a 
provincial rights perspective. Arthur Cardin conceded that Parliament had the power to generalize 
the application of bankruptcy to all of Canada; however, he claimed that the people in the province 
 
87. “Donovan Inquiry Weighs Canadian Law,” The New York Times, September 5, 1929, p.  26. 
88. Ibid. 
89. See Thomas G.W. Telfer, “Rediscovering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Power: Political and Constitutional 
Challenges to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, 1919-1929” (2017), 80 Sask. L. Rev. 37. 
90. Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue, [1928] A.C. 187 (P.C.). 
91. Alexandre Gérin-Lajoie, “Démolisseurs! Pour ne pas dire pire” (1928), 6 R. du D. 449 at p. 464 [translated by author]. 
Démolisseurs translates into demolishers or wreckers. 
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of Québec had been “suffering severely from the application” of the Bankruptcy Act.92 Cardin feared 
that the “new bureaucracy” would govern “not by law, but by regulations” and from Québec’s 
perspective would “impair the application of our civil laws.”93 Cardin feared that the “new 
organization at Ottawa... will be in a position to dictate to all the provinces.”94 Cardin argued that 
Parliament should “repeal the Bankruptcy Act” and return the regulation of debtor-creditor matters 
to the provinces. Unlike the extensive 1923 Parliamentary debates in which several Québec MPs 
argued in favour of repeal of the Bankruptcy Act, in 1932 no other Québec MP stood to support or 
endorse Cardin’s demand to abrogate the federal law. 
 
Given the thrust of the constitutional case law in the years immediately prior to and 
following the 1932 amendments, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to make a 
successful argument that the Superintendent’s powers or the licencing of trustees was not a proper 
exercise of the federal bankruptcy and insolvency power. Larue and several decisions throughout 
the 1930s continued to uphold the broad ambit of the federal bankruptcy and insolvency power 
under the Constitution in cases involving the Bankruptcy Act.95 In addition, the federal acts that 
dealt with insolvent companies96 and insolvent farmers97 were held to be valid exercises of the 
bankruptcy and insolvency power.98 Since a constitutional challenge to the federal Bankruptcy Act 
was unlikely to succeed, the Montreal Bar sought other ways to confront the first Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy.  
 
3. William John Reilley and The Montreal Bar’s Resolution of Censure 
 




95. Hoffar Ltd. v. Canadian Credit Men’s Trust Association, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 73; Pommier, Re, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 113 
(Ont. S.C.); Stuart v. Sutterby, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 754 (Ont. S.C.); Beiswanger (Plaintiff) Appellant v. City of Swift Current 
(Defendant) Respondent, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 407, at pp. 409-10; In re Society Shirt Company Limited, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 
561, 13 C.B.R. 216, at p. 561; Re Solloway, Mills & Co. Ltd., [1935] 1 D.L.R. 340 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 344; In re R.W. 
Minielly, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 281 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 283; Gard v. Yates, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 50 (B.C.S.C.), at pp. 56-57; Ladore 
et al. (Plaintiffs) Appellants v. Bennett et al. (Defendants) Respondents, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at pp. 6-7. 
96. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, supra, footnote 15. 
97. Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, supra, footnote 16. 
98. Reference re Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 (S.C.C.); British Columbia 




William J. Reilley, 193599 
 
The appointment of William J. Reilley was not accepted by all. In 1934, the Montreal Bar 
passed a motion of censure attacking his qualifications. His background demonstrates that he had 
the relevant experience for the position. Reilley trained as a lawyer in Alberta and practised in 
Ontario. In June 1924, Reilley became assistant Master of Ontario’s Supreme Court100 and four 
years later he was appointed as the Registrar of the Bankruptcy Court of Ontario. During the eight 
years that Reilley spent at Osgoode Hall, “...nearly 6,000 bankruptcies [...] passed through his hands 
involving total liabilities of over $125,000,000.”101  As Registrar, Reilley performed a judicial role 
and many of his decisions are reported in the Canadian Bankruptcy Reports.  
 
William J. Reilley’s ultimate appointment as Superintendent was well received by the 
Toronto media.102 The Globe prominently featured his appointment story on its front page.103 Lewis 
Duncan, a leading Ontario bankruptcy lawyer and author,104 praised the appointment: “An excellent 
beginning has been made, in the appointment as Superintendent of Bankruptcy, of Mr. W. J. Reilley, 
who for eight years has with independence and efficiency discharged the duties of Registrar in 
Bankruptcy for Ontario.”105 Yet in 1932, a Council of the Montreal Bar demanded Reilley’s 
 
99. B.M. Greene, ed., Who’s Who in Canada 1934-35 (Toronto: The Musson Book Company, 1935) at p. 216. 
100. “Obituary” (1946), 16 Fortnightly L.J. 106, at p. 106.  
101. Wilson, supra, footnote 4.  
102. Ibid. 
103. “W.J. Reilley Named as Superintendent of Bankruptcy” The Globe, September 15, 1932, at p. 1. 
104. Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922); Lewis Duncan and 
William John Reilley, Bankruptcy in Canada, 2nd  ed. (Toronto: Canadian Legal Authors, 1933). 
105. Duncan, supra, footnote 3, at p. 103.  
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resignation.106 In modern accounts of the origins of the Superintendent’s office there is no mention 
of the Montreal Bar’s reaction.107 
 
On December 16, 1932, the new Superintendent of Bankruptcy spoke to a large gathering 
of nearly 200 “trustees, former trustees and lawyers” in a Montreal courthouse.108 Reilley’s address 
“was really a definition of his position, a statement of the action he will take toward his job of seeing 
that the trustees do theirs.”109 Those who reported on Reilley’s speech did not provide extensive 
analysis or suggest that Reilley had said anything controversial. His remarks, however, caused 
“indignation”110 and the Bar of Montreal passed a Resolution of censure against Reilley. According 
to the Resolution, Reilley “stated, and allowed to be stated...thoughtless and injurious remarks 
against the Bankruptcy Court and the Bar of Montreal.”111 Consistent with earlier provincial rights 
attacks on the Bankruptcy Act, the Montreal Bar claimed that “without right or reason” Reilley had 
“obtruded himself into the administration of the Bankruptcy law” in Montreal. According to the 
Montreal Bar, Reilley was dealing with subjects which were “exclusively” within the jurisdiction 
of the provincial bankruptcy judge and of the Chief Justice.112  But constitutional law did not provide 
a realistic way to challenge the authority of the Superintendent. 
 
Turning away from jurisdictional issues, the Montreal Bar attacked Reilley’s personal 
qualifications. The Montreal Bar sought a Superintendent that was fluent in both French and 
English.113 While the Bar recognized Reilley’s knowledge of the Bankruptcy Act, they nonetheless 
believed that he lacked the qualifications “required of an official in the position that he occupies.” 
His qualifications fell short because of “his ignorance of the French language and of the laws of the 
Province of Quebec.” In addition, “his lack of tact, his absence of judgment and of discernment 
raise[d] doubts as to his competence to fulfill the high position that has been conferred upon him.”114 
The Montreal Bar resolution further stated “[t]hat the attitude and conduct of Mr. Reilley constitute 
an insult to the French-Canadian population of this city and show[s] contempt towards the Bench 
and Bar of this district.”115 
 
The final grievance raised by the Montreal Bar was the licencing of trustees in Montreal. 
The Department of Justice recognized that there were over 100 trustees operating in Montreal under 
the old regime with the generally held view that no more than 20 licenced trustees should be carrying 
on business in the city.116 It was inevitable that when Reilley announced the licences for Montreal  
trustees there was bound to be a critical reaction. Although trustee licences were to be granted under 
the authority of the Minister of Finance, Reilley had responsibility for administering the licensing 
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112. “Bankruptcy Head Under Fire”, supra, footnote 111.  
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115. Ibid. 
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regime.117 Reilley’s recommendations to the Minister of Finance in practice determined which 
applicants would receive licences.118 The Montreal Bar asserted that the principle underlying the 
new Act was that licences were to be “granted to the existing trustees unless there be some grave 
reasons against them.”119 The Montreal Bar’s resolution strongly suggested that existing trustees 
had not fared well under Reilley’s licencing regime. Disappointed with the allocation of trustee 
licences in Québec, the Bar’s complaint was infused with anti-Semitism:120 
 
the council is informed that in the choice of trustees in Montreal, Mr. Reilley has 
obviously been unduly influenced in recommending the granting of about fifteen licences 
to French-Canadians, against forty to English trustees, and ten to Jewish trustees.  
 
In a front page story Le Devoir reported on the licence allocation concluding that “en effect les Juifs 
ont gagné du terrain toute la semaine et sont passés de 7 à 10.”121  
Anti-Semitism also arose in other complaints about the bankruptcy regime. In 1933, the 
Confederation of Catholic Workers of Canada issued a memo calling for bankruptcy reform and 
stated: “We beg the Federal Government not to allow mass immigration of German-Jews to Canada, 
particularly to the province of Quebec.”122 From Saskatchewan, Harold B. Long wrote to the 
Attorney General of Canada complaining of a condition that “prevails here and I dare say over all 
of the Dominion”: 123 
 
It is the fact that Jews can go broke with a full pocket, buy back the bankrupt stock, start 
up again and make it harder than ever for the honest business man who is here year in 
and out. These chaps drift into a village rent an old building, sell under cost whilst we are 
powerless to do a thing but look on and take it...  Anything you can do to alleviate this 
disastrous condition will be greatly appreciated. 
 
The controversy of Reilley’s appointment did not disappear overnight. By 1933, a Québec 
MP sought to introduce a Bill which would have created a “joint superintendent of bankruptcy” 
who would be familiar with both official languages and Québec Civil Law.124 The Bill was not 
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accepted, and later that year a delegation from the Council of the Montreal Bar travelled to Ottawa 
to meet with the Minister of Finance to seek the resignation of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.125  
 
Reilley did not resign. Although the Montreal Bar’s resolution had attracted national 
attention, Reilley fared the storm and emerged seemingly unscathed.126 In 1933, he was appointed 
King’s Counsel. In that same year, he published, as a co-author, what was to become the leading 
Canadian bankruptcy text.127 The book was widely cited by courts throughout the 1930s.128 A 
Professor of Civil Law at the Université de Montréal praised the book in Revue du Droit and 
recommended it for the library of “any French-Canadian lawyer.”129 Reilley’s reputation extended 
to south of the border. As Superintendent, he became well known in bankruptcy circles in the US 
given that he attended a number of American bankruptcy conferences.130 Reilley began the tradition 
of Annual Reports containing statistics—a function that the Office of the Superintendent carries out 
to this day.131 Reilley remained at the helm of the new “national detective agency” until he died. On 
October 9, 1946, Reilley died suddenly at his residence following a “seizure...at work.”132 Canada’s 
first Superintendent of Bankruptcy was 64.133 Reilley served for fourteen years and to this day 




The Superintendent of Bankruptcy continues to perform an important function in the 
bankruptcy system and it is widely accepted that the creation of this office in 1932 improved 
transparency and accountability in the bankruptcy system. Modern explanations of the origins of 
the Superintendent do not include any reference to opposition to the creation of a new government 
official in Ottawa. Critics raised the image of a salaried bureaucrat travelling the country with a 
team of accountants and stenographers. Many warned against the creation of a new bankruptcy 
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bureaucracy, as there was reluctance to add to the size of the state. The Montreal Bar’s resolution 
of censure has not been accounted for in the modern literature. The resolution expressed concern 
that Reilley did not understand French or Québec Civil Law. In part, the Montreal Bar’s resolution 
of censure reflected the reality that any constitutional challenge to his powers would be unsuccessful 
and that an attack on Reilley’s qualifications formed an alternative strategy. To obtain a better 
understanding of the origins of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy one must move beyond what the 
reforms achieved and consider the arguments of those who opposed the legislative change. 
  
Finally, one must remember that the debate in 1932 was largely over administrative reforms 
that had very little to do with the Great Depression. The Bankruptcy Act in 1932 remained a tool for 
creditors. Debt relief and broadening the bankruptcy legislation was not on Parliament’s radar. 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy William Reilley privately lamented this in a 1933 memo to E.N. 
Rhodes, the Minister of Finance, claiming that the Bankruptcy Act was “not satisfactory.” Pointing 
to restrictions on creditors found in provincial debt adjustment legislation and the newly enacted 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, Reilley urged the Minister of Finance to reform the 
Bankruptcy Act to recognize the “desirability of saving debtors from financial wreckage rather than 
acting as a wrecking crew.”135 Perhaps William John Reilley recognized that there was a personal 
cost to bankruptcy. 
 
135. W.J. Reilley, Memorandum Re Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act to E.N. Rhodes, Minister of Finance, (December 
19, 1933), Department of Justice Papers, R.G. 13, vol. 2228, File 790, 1934, L.A.C. 
